A few months ago, I wrote that despite the energy of the Arab Spring, serious change wouldn't come to Morocco. I said that a mentality of stability permeates Moroccan society from the top down. The King wants stability for the benefit of his country's economy and society (and his political fortunes). Morocco's political elites want stability because they benefit from the status quo. The average Moroccan, as dire as his or her situation may be, also values stability because drastic change is so disruptive and often does not produce the desired outcome.
And yet protests came. The February 20 movement formed as a small but vocal opposition, calling for democratic reforms and claiming to represent the collective interests of Morocco's youth, by far the most disenfranchised section of the population. As the demonstrations continued, the King decided to respond, calling for constitutional reforms in March that were announced in late June and then put to a vote on July 1st.
What does it mean that these reforms, at best a small step towards real democracy, passed with 98% approval? Why did the monarchy choose reform in the first place? And what is the future of the February 20 and other opposition movements?
The result of Morocco's constitutional referendum was never in doubt. The whole process conflated the issue of constitutional reform with supporting the King. Holding the referendum a mere two weeks after Muhammad VI announced the reforms and declared "I'm voting yes" never allowed the question "will you vote yes in the referendum?" to take on any meaning other than "will you vote yes to the King?" Which is why the 98% approval of the reforms is neither surprising nor probably inaccurate. Morocco's monarchy is sacred, it is not questioned.
These are all reasons why the pro-democracy opposition - February 20 and others - boycotted the referendum. A boycott was the most politically viable way for these groups to express their displeasure with the constitutional reforms. An organized 'vote No' campaign would have failed on many fronts: if February 20 had been able to garner significant voter support, without appearing to oppose the King, it's unlikely the Interior Ministry would have let it show in the final results. February 20 can also claim the 25% of Moroccans who didn't participate in the referendum did so as an act of opposition, strengthening their political position. But will these tactics prove effective?
I think no matter how you look at it, February 20 came out of the referendum in a decidedly weaker position. It appears now that their strength was exaggerated. The moderate success of nationwide protests, several few high profile incidents (self-immolations, police beatings, etc.) and the energy of the region gave them sympathy both in Morocco and abroad. But the failure to impact the referendum, by choice and circumstance, diminishes that prestige. Now more than ever do they appear to represent the political margin, one that refuses to cooperate with the powers at be.
So what will the future bring?
I believe, the Monarchy and political mainstream will put increasing pressure on February 20 for their lack of participation in the referendum. You can already see the Moroccan media marginalizing the movement. This will stifle a real discussion about the Morocco's direction as the opposition loses its relevance and legitimacy. Moroccans are stuck with what they were given, and will have to make due.
To many, both in and out of Morocco, the constitutional reforms represented the monarchy's superficial concession to calls for democratic reform. Some changes did occur, and some of them even good. Whether those changes become manifest and Morocco takes a real step towards a democracy, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Morocco has had its change, at least for now.
And yet protests came. The February 20 movement formed as a small but vocal opposition, calling for democratic reforms and claiming to represent the collective interests of Morocco's youth, by far the most disenfranchised section of the population. As the demonstrations continued, the King decided to respond, calling for constitutional reforms in March that were announced in late June and then put to a vote on July 1st.
What does it mean that these reforms, at best a small step towards real democracy, passed with 98% approval? Why did the monarchy choose reform in the first place? And what is the future of the February 20 and other opposition movements?
The result of Morocco's constitutional referendum was never in doubt. The whole process conflated the issue of constitutional reform with supporting the King. Holding the referendum a mere two weeks after Muhammad VI announced the reforms and declared "I'm voting yes" never allowed the question "will you vote yes in the referendum?" to take on any meaning other than "will you vote yes to the King?" Which is why the 98% approval of the reforms is neither surprising nor probably inaccurate. Morocco's monarchy is sacred, it is not questioned.
These are all reasons why the pro-democracy opposition - February 20 and others - boycotted the referendum. A boycott was the most politically viable way for these groups to express their displeasure with the constitutional reforms. An organized 'vote No' campaign would have failed on many fronts: if February 20 had been able to garner significant voter support, without appearing to oppose the King, it's unlikely the Interior Ministry would have let it show in the final results. February 20 can also claim the 25% of Moroccans who didn't participate in the referendum did so as an act of opposition, strengthening their political position. But will these tactics prove effective?
I think no matter how you look at it, February 20 came out of the referendum in a decidedly weaker position. It appears now that their strength was exaggerated. The moderate success of nationwide protests, several few high profile incidents (self-immolations, police beatings, etc.) and the energy of the region gave them sympathy both in Morocco and abroad. But the failure to impact the referendum, by choice and circumstance, diminishes that prestige. Now more than ever do they appear to represent the political margin, one that refuses to cooperate with the powers at be.
So what will the future bring?
I believe, the Monarchy and political mainstream will put increasing pressure on February 20 for their lack of participation in the referendum. You can already see the Moroccan media marginalizing the movement. This will stifle a real discussion about the Morocco's direction as the opposition loses its relevance and legitimacy. Moroccans are stuck with what they were given, and will have to make due.
To many, both in and out of Morocco, the constitutional reforms represented the monarchy's superficial concession to calls for democratic reform. Some changes did occur, and some of them even good. Whether those changes become manifest and Morocco takes a real step towards a democracy, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Morocco has had its change, at least for now.
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